WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION: RECOVERY
UNDER THE POSITIONAL RISK DOCTRINE
FOR PERSONALLY MOTIVATED ASSAULTS.
While performing duties for her employer, Lillian A. Schick
was killed by her former husband. The employer manufactured
table pads and decedent's job was to measure the tables of the retail
outlet customers. Using an assumed name, Mrs. Schick's former
husband formulated an elaborate ruse whereby Mrs. Schick was
sent to measure his table. Upon her arrival at his apartment he
killed her and committed suicide.
The referee of the Workmen's Compensation Appeals Board
issued a take nothing award, finding that injury and death did not
arise out of the employment. On petition for reconsideration, the
Workmen's Compensation Appeals Board awarded compensation,
finding that the employment did contribute to the death by placing
decedent in an isolated location and thereby facilitating the assault.
The Court of Appeal annulled the award, accepting petitioner's
contention that the injury and death were caused by an assault
originating in a personal dispute and thus could not arise out of the
employment relationship. The Workmen's Compensation Appeals
Board's petition for a hearing before the California Supreme Court
was granted. Held, affirmed: Mrs. Schick's duties placed her in an
isolated location, which facilitated and thus contributed to her
death. California Compensation and Fire Co. v. Workmen's
Compensation Appeals Board [hereinafter referred to as California Comp.].'
The California Labor Code' provides that for an injury or
death to be compensable, it must occur in the course of
employment and must arise out of the employment. "Course of the
employment" refers to the time, place and circumstances under
which an injury occurs,3 while "arising out of the employment"
relates to the cause of the injury, or the risks or hazards entailed by
1. 68 Adv. Cal. 155, 436 P.2d 67, 65 Cal. Rptr. 155 (1968).
2. CAL. LABOR CODE § 3600 (West 1955). "Liability . . .shall . . . exist against an
employer for any injury sustained by his employees arising out of and in the course of the
employment and for the death of any employee if the injury proximately causes the death
3. 2 W. HANNA, CALIFORNIA LAW OF EMPLOYEE
COMPENSATION § 9.01 [1] [b]
(2d ed. 1967).
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the employment

California has construed "arising out of the

employment" to mean the origin or source of the injury, requiring
some connection between employment and injury.'
Understanding California's present construction of "arising

out of employment" requires a brief survey of the three major
interpretations of this phrase by American courts. These in-

terpretations are: (1) The peculiar risk or increased risk doctrine;
(2) the actual risk doctrine; and (3) the positional risk doctrine.,
The peculiar or increased risk doctrine,' favored by most courts,

finds an injury arising out of the employment only when it
originates in a hazard peculiar to or increased by that employment

and not common to people generally. A substantial number of
other jurisdictions have adopted the actual risk doctrine' which
requires only that there be an employment related risk; it is
irrelevant that the risk is common to all persons. Under the
positional risk doctrine,9 followed by only a few jurisdictions, an

injury can be found to arise .out of the employment if it would not
have happened "but for" the fact that the duties of employment

required the claimant to be in the place or location where the injury
occurred. Among the courts which utilize this test, most find it
more convenient to apply it to selected situations, rather than adopt
it outright."0 California, however, appears to have fully adopted the
positional risk doctrine."
Cases such as California Comp. pose a unique question of
application of the positional risk doctrine in that the derivation of

the injury is solely personal. Traditionally, as stated by Arthur
4. Id. § 10.0112].
5. Id. The Labor Code also requires the injury or death to be proximately caused by
the employment. This is not synonomous with the proximate cause requirement in torts.
It adds nothing to, and takes nothing from, the general coverage formula that injury
must have been one arising out of and in the course of employment. Winter v. Industrial
Ace. Comm'n., 129 Cal. App. 2d 174, 176, 276 P.2d 689, 691 (1954).
6. I A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 6.00 (1966).
7. Id. § 6.20.
8. Id. § 6.30.
9. Id. § 6.40.
10. Id. Larson argues that:
[t]his theory supports compensation, for example, .in cases of stray bullets,
roving lunatics, and other situations in which the only connection of the
employment with the injury is that its obligations placed the employee in the
particular place at the particular time when he was injured by some neutral
force.. . . (emphasis added).
II. California Comp. & Fire Co. v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd., 61 Cal. Rptr.
262, 266 (1967).
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Larson 2 in The Law of Workmen's Compensation, awards have
not been allowed for injuries attributable to personally motivated
assaults:
Assaults for private reasons do not arise out of the employment
unless, by facilitating an assault which would not otherwise be
made, the employment becomes a contributory factor. 3
Professor Larson subsequently stipulates than when a dispute is
"imported" into the employment from the claimant's domestic or
personal life, the assault does not arise out of the employment
under any test.
Even the broadest of all, the but for or positional risk test, rules
out compensability because [it] applies only when the risk is
4
neutral'
The neutral risks referred to by Professor Larson are potentially
injurious conditions that are neither distinctly employment related
nor distinctly personal in nature." In annulling the award of the
Workmen's Compensation Appeals Board, the Court of Appeal in
California Comp. recognized this limitation on the positional risk
6
doctrine as decisive.'
In the development of workmen's compensation law,
California has applied each of the foregoing theories. A
consideration of these previous decisions will demonstrate the
changing attitude of California courts toward causation in
workmen's compensation. The first theory applied in California
was the peculiar risk doctrine. While this doctrine was strictly
construed at first, 7 by 1924 the state had begun to move away from
the rigid requirement that the injury be one not common to the
general public.'" Subsequently California's position became more
liberal, moving toward adoption of the actual risk doctrine, 9 until
in 1942 the Supreme Court specifically rejected the requirement
that injuries be peculiar to employment. 0 The first decision in
12.
School.
13.
14.
15.
16.
262, 266
17.

Arthur Larson; Director, Rule of Law Research Center; Duke University Law

1 A. LARSON, supra note 6, at § 11.00 (emphasis added).
Id. § 11.21.
Id. § 7.30.
California Comp. & Fire Co. v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd., 61 Cal. Rptr.
(1967).
Coronado Beach Co. v. Pillsubry, 172 Cal. 682, 158 P. 212 (1916).
18. 8 HASTINGS L.J. 49, 51 (196-57).
19. Id. at 51,52.
20. Pacific Emp. Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n., 19 Cal. 2d 622, 629, 122
P.2d 570, 573'(1942).
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which California applied the positional risk doctrine came in 1950.
In IndustrialIndemnity Co. v. IndustrialAccident Commission,2
the Supreme Court found an injury to be compensable if the
employment brought the employee to a dangerous position where
he was injured while acting within the scope of his employment.2"
In California Comp., the Supreme Court relied primarily on
Madin v. Industrial Accident Commission2 3 and Wiseman v.
IndustrialA ccident Commission.24 The Madin and Wiseman cases
appear to be the most liberal decisions to date and are applications

of the positional risk doctrine. In Madin, the employee, while at
work, was injured when a building he was occupying was struck by
a runaway bulldozer.25 Wiseman involved an employee on a
business trip, who was asphyxiated as the result of a fire in his hotel
room.26 The significance of these cases lies in the ruling, that to find
injury or death arising out of employment, the employment need
not be the sole cause of injury; it is sufficient if it is a contributory
cause. Both Madin and Wiseman imply that virtually any
contribution by the employment will confirm that the injury "arises
out of the employment".2"

In California Comp., it was held that although the origin of
the assault was not connected with the employment, the

employment did contribute by placing the deceased in an isolated
location "that facilitated the assault. ' 29 In discussing this
contribution rule, Madin bases its holding on Colonial Insurance
21. 95 Cal. App. 2d 804, 214 P.2d 41 (1950).
22. Id. at 813, 214 P.2d at 47.
23. 46 Cal. 2d 9d, 292 P.2d 892 (1956).
24. 46 Cal. 2d 570, 297 P.2d 649 (1956).
25. After drinking intoxicants, three young men decided to go "riding" on the
bulldozer. They were unable to stop the bulldozer, and consequently abandoned it over
the side of a canyon.
26. The fire was started by the smoking of either the employee or a 'female
companion, not his wife. The court rejected the contention that because there were
indications that the employee was engaged in immoral conduct, his death could not arise
out of the scope of employment.
27. Madin v. Industrial Ace. Comm'n., 46 Cal. 2d at 92, 292 P.2d at 894.
28. See 8 HASTINGS L.J. at 54, 55.,
29. Logically a distinction between facilitating an assault and contributing to one
would have been appropriate in this case. Whereas contributing connotes an affirmative
participation in the assault by the employment, facilitating indicates a passive connection.
With an active participation by employment (i.e. contribution) it logically follows that
the injury could be found to arise out of the employment. It would seem, however, with
no more than a passive facilitating effect that the injury should not be found to arise out
of the employment.
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Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission," a case involving an
.employee who contracted silicosis. In Colonial, the court used the
word "contribution" to indicate that while employment had been

the sole cause of the disease, the employee had worked for several
companies in this type of employment while progressively incurring
the disease. In Pacific Employers Insurance Co. v. Industrial
Accident Commission,3 ' the employment contributed to a personal
assault by requiring the employee to work with a man who proved

to be insane. The victim associated with the assailant only during
working hours and the animosity resulting in the assault grew out
of the employment relationship alone. There appear to be no
California cases setting forth what employment must "do" to

contribute to an injury resulting from a personal assault. 2 Other
states too, are divided on what effect the employment must have to
find that, in spite of the personally motivated assault, the injury

arises out of it." The type of contribution present in California
30. 29 Cal. 2d 79, 172 P.2d 884 (1946).
31. 139 Cal. App. 2d 260, 293 P.2d 502 (1956). This is apparently the only
California case dealing with personally motivated assaults since the adoption of the
positional risk doctrine.
32. California Comp. & Fire Co. v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd., 61 Cal. Rptr.
262, 265 (1967).
We have found no case in this jurisdiction which considers or states . . . the
rule of law which is applicable to a case of assault by a person whose
relationship with the employee was established outside of the employment and
whose reasons for the assault were personal.
33. California Comp. & Fire Co. v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd., 68 Adv. Cal.
155, 436 P.2d 67, 65 Cal. Rptr. 155 (1968).
Cases from other jurisdictions give us no guidance, for they are in conflict as
to whether a privately motivated assault is compensable where its commission
was facilitated by the employment.
Cases rejecting the argument that contribution by the employment will counteract the
effect of the personally motivated assault are: Service Mut. Ins. Co. v. Vaughn, 130
S.W.2d 392 (Texas Civ. App. 1939); May v. Ozark Cent. Tel. Co., 272 S.W.2d 845 (Mo.
1954); January-Wood Co. v. Schumacher, 231 Ky. 705, 22 S.W.2d 117 (1929):
Does the fact that his duty put him in such a place as gave his murderer an
opportunity to carry out his nefarious design with less probability of
apprehension than if he did so elsewhere constitute such casual relation as to
bring the result within the term 'arising out of his employment'? We hardly
think so....,
Ramos v. Taxi Transit Co., 301 N.Y. 749, 95 N.E.2d 625 (1950); Harden v. Thomasville
Furniture Co., 199 N.C. 733, 155 S.E. 728 (1930). Cases accepting the same argument
are: Todd v. Easton Furniture Mfg. Co., 147 Md. 352, 128 A. 42 (1925).
The conditions under which he was working when he lost his life were such as
to place him at a special disadvantage . . . . The assault which caused his
death might have been committed elsewhere, but the attack could be made
with greater assurance of success, and of safety for the assassin, if planned

1969]

CO MMENTS

Comp. represents a far more tenuous basis for recovery than prior

California cases have allowed.34 The court's own terminology,
"facilitating", would seem most descriptive of the role of the

employment here, intimating a passive rather than contributory
part in the assault."
Madin and Wiseman are distinguisable from California
Comp. in that not only does neither case include the same type of

contribution, but they do not deal with injuries attributable to
personally motivated assaults. 6 Likewise, no pre-CaliforniaComp.
decision based on Madin" or Wiseman" has involved such an
assault."
If it is correct to conclude that a substantive basis for this
decision is not to be found in previous California cases, perhaps the
real explanation of this holding and its significance for the future
for a time when the intended victim was performing his lonely duty and was
without opportunity to obtain assistance.
Id. at 353, 128 A. 43; Williams v. United States Casualty Co., 145 So. 2d 592 (La. App.
1962).
34. Colonial Ins. Co. v. Industrial Ace. Comm'n., 29 Cal. 2d 79, 172 P.2d 884
(1946). The employee contracted silicosis due to exposure to silica dust while working as
a crusher operator for a brick manufacturer; Pacific Emp. Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acc.
Comm'n., 139 Cal. App. 2d 260, 293 P.2d 502 (1956). The employee was required to
work with a man who proved to be suffering from insane delusions, resulting, in the
assault.
35. See note 29 supra.
36. This poses the biggest problem in California Comp. The substantive law on
which the decision is based involves acts of negligence, not intentional criminal acts.
Although Madin involves criminal conduct, the injury-producing act was negligent. Yet,
the Board and the supreme court in discussing the applicability of these cases to
California Comp. do not make this distinction.
37. State Comp. Ins. Fund v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n., 176 Cal. App. 2d 10, 1 Cal.
Rptr. 73 (1959) (carpenter driving a rusty nail which flew up when struck and hit him in
the eye causing injury); Argonaut Ins. Co. v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd., 247 Cal.
App. 2d 669, 55 Cal. Rptr. 810 (1967) (employee injured while roughhousing with fellow
employee in ranch bunkhouse); Grant v. Board of Retirement, Kern County Employees
Retirement Assoc., 253 Cal. App. 2d 1020, 61 Cal. Rptr. 791 (1967) (employee suffered
heart attack).
38. Leonard Van Stelle Inc. v. Industrial Ace. Comm'n., 59 Cal. 2d 836, 382 P.2d
587, 31 Cal. Rptr. 467 (1963) (automobile accident); Van Cleve v. Workmen's Comp.
Appeals Bd., 261 Adv. Cal. App. 246, 67 Cal. Rptr. 757 (1968) (back injury suffered by
reaching into rear seat of auto on the way to work).
39. The supreme court also relies on Western Greyhound Lines v. Ind. Acc.
Comm'n., 225 Cal. App. 2d 517, 37 Cal. Rptr. 580 (1964) for the proposition .that failure
of the homicide to originate in the employment did not preclude the award. In Western
Greyhound a woman busdriver was assaulted while on a coffee break. The issue to be
determined was whether the busdriver was in the course of employment while on the
coffee break, and the issue of whether the assault arose out of the employment was not
discussed.

SAN DIEGO LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 6

lies in the continuing direction of compensation awards.4" While
CaliforniaComp. is apparently not grounded on the original policy
reasons underlying workmen's compensation, it is consistent with
the existing trend of decisions. Prior to enactment of workmen's
compensation legislation, with the tremendous growth of industry
and corresponding growth of industrial accidents, the usual
common law defenses often rendered futile any legal action by the
employee against the employer.4 Because of the distress and
economic insecurity to which an inadequate legal system subjected
victims of industrial accidents, the individual states took it upon
themselves to devise remedies.42 The resultant workmen's
compensation acts were founded on the precept that industry
should, in large measure, bear the burden of industrial accidents,"
and that restitution should be made for disabilities "attributable"
to employment.44 These acts were designed to provide a more
humanitarian and equitable remedy, based on the economic
principle of "trade risk" in that injuries incident to industrial
pursuits are like wages and breakage of machinery, a part of the
cost of production. 5 As a result, the initial burden thus imposed on
the employer will be distributed, as part of the cost of production,
among consumers." Since the inception of workmen's
compensation legislation, California decisions have become
increasingly liberal as to what constitutes "arising out of
employment."47 This is probably appropriate in light of the Labor
Code itself which states that its provisions shall be liberally
construed by the courts. 8 Furthermore, Madin held that reasonable
40. See text accompanying notes 17-22, supra.
41. 2 W. HANNA, supra note 3, at § 1.01.
42. 2 W. HANNA, supra note 2, at §§ 1.01[2], 1.05[1].

43. California Comp. Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n., 128 Cal. App. 2d 797,
805, 276 P.2d 148, 151 (1954).
44. Associated Indem. Corp. v. Industrial Ace. Comm'n., 71 Cal. App. 2d 820, 824,
163 P.2d 771, 773 (1945).
45. 1 A. HONNOLD, A TREATISE ON THE AMERICAN AND ENGLISH WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION LAWS,

§ 2, note 7 (1917).

46. Western Indem. Co. v. Pillsbury, 170 Cal. 686, 694, 151 P. 398, 401 (1915).

47. 8

HASTINGS

L.J. at 54. While the author of that comment felt that the terms in

the course of and arising out of were at that time "virtually synonomous", they are not
yet always considered so and logically never should be. The terms represent distinct

aspects of an injury or death relative to workmen's compensation and both are not
always present together.

48. CAL. LABOR CODE & 3202 (Vest 1955).
The provisions of Division 4 [Workmen's Compensation and Insurance] ...
shall be liberally construed by the courts with the purpose of extending their
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doubts as to whether an injury is compensable are to be resolved in
favor of the employee.4 9 It seems doubtful, however, that those
responsible for workmen's compensation legislation in California
contemplated that occurrences such as this would lead to
compensation. Domestic and other personal disputes that could
result in assault existed then as now. It cannot be said that, under
such circumstances, the employment relationship gives rise to
common law defenses that bar recovery for an injury inflicted by a
third party. Nor is it valid to argue that assaults growing out of
disputes in the employee's personal life are part of the. "trade risks"
assumed by the employer in the course of doing business. There
appears to be an inconsistency in finding that an injury originating
in a domestic dispute should be remedied by virtue of laws enacted
because of a concern over the rise in industry-oriented accidents. As
declared by the Court of Appeal in CaliforniaComp.:
[T]he Workmen's Compensation Law does not charge industry
for injury or death which comes to an employee through
personal contacts unrelated to his employment. Where there is
positive evidence showing that that is the case, there is no
justification for assuming, contrary to the facts, that industry is
responsible.s°
The California Comp. decision virtually abolishes the
traditional stand in this state against compensating injuries or
death caused by a personally motivated assault originating outside
the employment relationship." By predicating their decision on
Madin and Wiseman, the Workmen's Compensation Appeals
Board has not expressly recognized what appears to be the basic
benefits for the protection of persons injured in the course of their
employment (emphasis added).
The code's call for liberal construction of provisions when a person is injured in the
course of employment, provides the most substantial basis for the California Conip.
decision, even though not alluded to by the supreme court or the Workmen's
Compensation Appeals Board.
49. 46 Cal. 2d at 93, 292 P.2d at 894.
50. 61 Cal. Rptr. at 266.
51. 58 AMt. JUR. Workmen's Compensation § 265 (1948). The traditional approach
to this problem is stated:
When the assault . . . is for reasons personal to the assailant, and is not
because the relation of employer and employee exists, and the employment is
not the cause, though it may be the occasion of the wrongful act, and may
give a convenient opportunity for its execution, it is ordinarily held that the
injury does not arise out of the employment (emphasis added).
See Royal Indem. Co. v. Industrial Ace. Comm'n., 192 Cal. 675, 221 P. 371 (1923);
Lykins v. Industrial Ace. Comm'n., 25 C.C.C. 194 (1960).
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problem in the case.12 Decisions in other jurisdictions, as well as the
Court of Appeal in CaliforniaComp., have distinguished personally

motivated assaults originating within, from those outside the
employment relationship, finding the latter not to be neutral risks
and thus not resolvable under the positional risk doctrine."
The precedent established by the facts and decision in
California Comp. would seem to require compensation in nearly
every case of assault occurring during the course of employment.' 4
In cases such as this, where there is an absence of tangible
contribution by the employment, probably the most precise means

of establishing this factor-is by examining the intent or state of
mind of the assailant." If his state of mind is such that he is
unconcerned with the possibility of detection, then it appears
52. 1 A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 11.21 (Supp. 1968).
In criticizing a similar case, Rogers v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 173 So. 2d 231 (La. App.
1965), Larson states:
The precise question involved is: should the positional risk theory be applied
not only to neutral risks but also to purely personal risks?
The above statement related to an injury resulting from personal assault originating
outside the employment relationship.
53. 1 A. LARSON, supra note 6, at 11.21.
This [distinction is based on] the justification [for] the positional risk
doctrine, which is that this very slight employment contribution (bringing
decedent to the place where he was killed) is enough to swing the balance
only if it is not offset by a positive showing of the personal cause of the harm
(emphasis added).
I A. LARSON, supra note 6, at 11.21, note 34.
In eight states there is a separate statutory defense applicable to injury
inflicted by third persons for personal reasons. . . . The states having this
type of defense are Alabama, Georgia, Delaware, Iowa . . . Minnesota,
Pennsylvania, Texas and Wyoming. . . (emphasis added).
54. See discussion note 51 supra. In California Conp. the contribution by
employment is so slight and the assailant's intent to commit the assault so great that it
seems that the maj6rity of future assaults occurring in the course of employment would
involve an equal or greater employment participation and accordingly would of necessity
be found to arise out of the employment.
55. I A. LARSON, supra note 6, at § 11.23.
Admittedly, it is a difficult question of fact whether, but for the favorable
opportunity created by the employment environment, the murderer would
have dared commit the murder. If his desperation and character are such that
[the] probability of detection would make no difference to him then it is a
fair conclusion that he would have gone through with the deed in any case;
for example, if he is bent on committing suicide immediately after the
murder.
This is arguably the most logical analysis of the facts presented in California Conip.
Surprisingly it was ignored by the supreme court even though it is found in a passage to
which the majority opinion referred.
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probable that he would commit the assault whether or not the
employment afforded a convenient opportunity. In California
Comp. the assailant had at least twice threatened to murder his wife
and commit suicide, and had been despondent for a substantial
period of time prior to the assault. 6 Despite this, the Workmen's
Compensation Appeals Board held that the murder would not have
occurred had Mrs. Schick's employment not required her to go to
this isolated apartment. It would appear that most assaults
occurring in the course of employment would fall within the factual
boundaries of the California Comp. decision and -thus result in
compensation. A recent criticism of a similar case states:
The court here would have done better to leave itself some
leeway for the future in this class of cases .... This would avoid

leaving matters in such a posture that absolutely any personal
assault under any circumstances becomes compensable if it
occurs within the time and space limits of the employment."
The Workmen's Compensation Appeals Board has opened the
door to compensation in an area where compensation in the past
has been virtually unheard of, and yet has done so without making
what would appear to be necessary distinctions between neutral
risks and purely personal risks." The supreme court has added the
force of its approval to this interpretation. 9 Review by the supreme
56. California Comp. & Fire Co. v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd., 61 Cal. Rptr.
262, 263 (1967).
The evidence including a letter written by him, indicated that the murder and
suicide were premeditated and carried out because of his frustration and
bitterness at his failure after numerous attempts to effect a reconciliation
with decedent, and the fact known to him that she was planning to marry
another man.
At another time, Schick threatened suicide in a conversation with his wife telling her that
he would take her with him if he ever did it. Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Review at
25, California Comp. & Fire Co. v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd., 68 Adv. Cal. 155,
436 P.2d 67, 65 Cal. Rptr. 155 (1968).
57. I A. LARSON, supra note 52, § 11.21 n.34 (Supp. 1968). The supplement here
cited covered cases through December 31, 1967 and it is interesting that the district
court of appeal decision in California Comp. was noted with approval. With the supreme
court's optimistic reference to a "possible" rescuer it might well be asked if they would
have sustained an award had a rescuer intervened and Mrs. Schick received only nonfatal injuries. Can it be that the existence of "contribution" by employment is to some
degree dependent on the actions of an unkown third party?
58. See note 52 supra.

59. "There is no sound reason to deny compensation to an employee whose duties
expose her to a peculiar risk of assault merely because the assailant was motivated by
personal animus." California Comp. & Fire Co. v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd., 68
Adv. Cal. 155, 160, 436 P.2d 67, 70, 65 Cal. Rptr. 155, 158 (1968).
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court and the courts of appeal in California workmen's
compensation is limited by the Labor Code.60 The ruling of the
supreme court has affirmed that it is reasonable and within the
powers of the Workmen's Compensation Appeals Board to award
compensation for injury or death caused by a personally motivated
assault, making no apparent distinctions as to those assaults
originating in disputes unrelated to the employment. 6 Their
decision strengthens past holdings that the "substantial evidence", 2
required by the Labor Code to sustain the findings and conclusions
of the Board is in fact any evidence. 63 This expansion of benefits
under California workmen's compensation goes further in allowing
compensation than all but apparently two other American
64
jurisdictions have been willing to go.
STEVEN

E.

BRIGGS

60. CAL. LABOR CODE § 5952 (West 1955).
The [scope of] review by the court shall not be extended further than to
determine. . . whether:
(a) The commission acted without or in excess of its powers. (b)
The order, decision or award was procured by fraud. (c) The order,
decision, or award was unreasonable. (d) The order, decision, or
award was not supported by substantial evidence. (e) If findings of
fact are made, such findings of fact support the order, decision, or
award under review....
61. It could be argued the supreme court has impliedly made a distinction by
holding that this assault does arise out of the scope of employment. If that is their
intended result it could be reached only by choosing to disregard the source of the dispute
out of which the assault grew. It is this "origin" that should be considered to determine
whether the assault arises out of the employment relationship.
62. "The order, decision, or award [must be] supported by substantial evidence."
CAL. LABOR CODE § 5952(d) (West 1955).
63. Argonaut Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n., 221 Cal. App. 2d 140, 149, 34
Cal. Rptr. 206, 211 (1963).
64. See generally I A. LARSON, supra note 52, at § 11.23; Todd v. Easton Furn,
Manufacturing Co., 147 Md. 352, 128 A. 42 (1925); Rogers v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.,
173 So. 2d 231 (La. App. 1965).

